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THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND

LAND-LOCKED STATES' ACCESS
TO THE SEA: AN ANALOGY
Hali Rahman Basaran
INTRODUCTION

International law is a discipline prone to changes that permanently
overstep, exceed and transcend existing boundaries. Frontier knowledge
and frontier international law are increasing, no matter how unconvincing
their capacity to deliver a better future.' This frontier sociability "is
grounded on limits as well as on a constant transgression of limits." 2 In
other words, there is constant change in international law aimed at satisfying the needs of the international community.
Constant change and the need to expand the established parameters of
international law are linked to the notion that international law has a "public
nature." The public nature of international law obliges it to deal with the
totality of concerns to the "public interest." 3 Namely, international law cannot remain indifferent to interests and concerns voiced by the international
community. In this context, the concerns raised by the new concepts of the
Responsibility to Protect ("R2P") and access to the sea for land-locked
states ("LLS") should be covered by "public" international law.
The concept of Responsibility to Protect was proposed by a commission convened by Canada in 2001, and was subsequently endorsed by the
United Nations' ("UN") 2005 World Summit Outcome,4 the Security Coun1. See Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Three Metaphors for a New Conception of
Law: The Frontier, the Baroque, and the South, 29 LAW & Soc'y REV. 569, 575
(1995).
2. Id. at 575.
3. Gianluigi Palombella, Global Legislation and its Discontents, in INTERNATIONAL LAW MAKING 57, 70 (Rain Liivoja & Jarna Petman eds., 2014).
4. G.A. Res. 60/1, 1 138-39, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2015), availableat
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ods.A-RES-60-I-E.pdf (Paragraph 138 states:
"Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from geno-

cide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility
entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance
with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help

States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing
an early warning capability. Paragraph 139: The international community, through

the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of
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cil ("SC"),5 and the General Assembly ("GA") resolutions. 6 In the event of

a nation state's neglect or failure to prevent genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, or other war crimes within its own borders, the
international community is obliged by the R2P to urge or indeed challenge
the state to protect its citizens and, if deemed necessary, militarily
intervene.
The question of LLS' access to the sea raises the question of whether
LLS ought to have rights under international law with respect to access to
the sea. At present, LLS depend on the goodwill of transit countries for
maritime contact and have been in search of a robust mechanism under
international law that could constrain the discretion of transit states. This
issue is sensitive because it leads to intense debate and speculation as to
what extent-and under what principles-the sovereignty of the transit
the Charter, to help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take
collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in
accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in
cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful
means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of
the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as
necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and
to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.").
5. The R2P principle has been, directly or indirectly, referred to by the Security
Council for the protection of civilians in intra-State armed conflicts. See, e.g., S.C. Res.
1674, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006) (concerning Darfur); S.C. Res. 1706,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1706 (Aug. 31, 2006) (concerning Darfur); S.C. Res. 1814, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1814 (May 15, 2008) (concerning Somalia); S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/
1973 (Mar. 17, 2011) (concerning Libya); S.C. Res. 1975, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1975 (Mar.
30, 2011) (concerning Ivory Coast). In addition, the Security Council has implicitly or
explicitly approved some unilateral humanitarian interventions after they took place,
such as the Economic Community of West African States' (ECOWAS) intervention.
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 788, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1992 (Nov. 19, 1992) (intervention in Liberia); S.C. Res. 1132, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1997 (Oct. 8, 1997) (intervention in Sierra
Leone).
6. On September 14, 2009, the General Assembly passed its first resolution on the
R2P. See G.A. Res. 63/308, U.N. Doc. AIRES/308 (Oct. 7, 2009). A General Assembly
debate on July 12, 2011 reasserted its support for the R2P concept. See U.N. President
of the G.A., Informal Interactive Dialogue on the Role of Regional and Sub-regional
Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (July 12, 2011), available
at http://www.un.org/en/galpresident/65/iniatives/RtoPdialogue.html.
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states may be limited. Though LLS' access to the sea has been subject to
multiple bilateral and multilateral treaties, the last universal initiative in the
area was undertaken by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea ("UNCLOS") (1982), which entered into effect in 1994.1
Both the R2P and LLS' access to the sea represent legitimate and crucially unavoidable "public" concerns of the international community. Both
involve and engage the "completeness" of international law. Yet achieving
a complete international law is a conceptual and practical challenge of the
highest order. A corollary to the aim of "publicness" is the "completeness"
of international law. Completeness concerns actors' willingness to be recognized as rightful participants in the international system and making their
voice heard on the world stage. These actors claim that international law
would be complete if they were recognized as subjects of international law.
Persecuted opposition groups within national borders and LLS epitomize
such actors. Indeed, the challenges posed by the application of R2P to protect opposition groups and LLS's efforts to access the sea constitute disputes at the frontiers of international law.
In particular, the current Syrian crisis raises questions as to the legality
and practicability of the R2P. The lack of intervention in the Syrian conflict
in contrast to the 2011 intervention in Libya, which was based on United
Nations Security Council ("SC") Resolution 1973 endorsing the R2P,8 calls
into question the reliability of the R2P doctrine and whether it can be conceptualized and implemented as a norm of international law. Similarly, the
recent application of Bolivia, a land locked state, to the International Court
of Justice ("ICJ") against Chile, the transit state, underscored the importance and problems associated with LLS' access to the sea.9 Bolivia's confinement and the confinement of the Syrian opposition groups is therefore
ripe for analogy, and serves as a useful vehicle to explore the frontiers of
international law. It is important to note that Bolivia's status as a sovereign
state allowed it to resort to the ICJ, an inter-state court, whereas Syrian
opposition groups have no such sovereign status and therefore no ability to
resort to the ICJ. Given Bolivia's status, articulating and investigating purported similarities between a sovereign state and opposition groups may not
7. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
8. S.C. Res. 1973, para. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES.1973 (Mar. 17, 2011), available at
(accessed
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view-doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1973(2011),
on Feb. 19, 2015).
9. See Press Release, International Court of Justice, Bolivia institutes proceedings
against Chile with regard to a dispute concerning the obligation of Chile to negotiate the
"sovereign access of Bolivia to the Pacific Ocean" (Apr. 24, 2013) available at http://
www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/153/17340.pdf.
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seem wholly pertinent. It is difficult to argue that opposition groups are
subjects of international law. Nevertheless, the confinement of Bolivia and
the Syrian opposition groups presents an interesting analogy and leads to
interesting propositions regarding the current state of international law. Indeed, both cases concern new expectations created in the international
community.
The doctrine of R2P as invoked by the Syrian opposition groups as
well as new developments in the field of LLS' access to the sea resulted in
increased lobbying on the part of LLS and the recent Bolivian case for
access to the sea,' 0 which raises legitimate expectations. Furthermore, as
both problems involve the notion of state sovereignty, they stand as proof
that the definition of "sovereignty" remains the subject of heated debate
within the realm of international law. Indeed, "assertions in terms of sovereignty are not indefeasible; they are more in the character of presumptions
rather than inflexible rules."" Both the R2P and LLS' access to the sea are
the subject of intense negotiation on the international political stage, and
both question the foundations of modem international law. Sovereign countries such as Syria do not wish to recognize opposition groups as legitimate
and legal counterparts. Against the premises of the R2P, sovereign states
argue that there can be no formally recognized international "dispute"
where conflict occurs between an internationally recognized government
representing the state and opposition groups. Similarly, in the case of Bolivian access to the sea, Chile argues that as a sovereign transit country, it has
no obligation to negotiate the issue of transit with Bolivia. That is, the territorial jurisdiction of Chile is absolute. Although Chile has welcomed negotiations with Bolivia to address its request for access to the sea, Chile
maintains that no legal dispute exists between the two nations.
Both the R2P and LLS' access to the sea have problems in upgrading
to full-fledged and self-standing legal rights because they represent the consolidation of inequalities in international law. Both concern unequal treaties: the United Nations Charter, as an international treaty, may be deemed
an unequal treaty affecting the relationship between sovereign governments
and opposition groups; the 1904 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between
Bolivia and Chile, which formalized the LLS status of Bolivia 2 by turning
10. The application of Bolivia to the International Court of Justice relates to

Chile's obligation to negotiate in good faith and effectively with Bolivia in order to
reach an agreement granting Bolivia a fully sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean.
I1. James Crawford, Sovereignty as a Legal Value, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW

117, 121 (James Crawford & Martti Koskenniemi eds.,

2012).
12. The present treaty recognizes the absolute and perpetual dominion of Chile
over the territories it has occupied by virtue of Article 2 of the True Pact of Apr. 4,
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defacto occupation by Chile of Bolivian territory into dejure Chilean territory; and, more generally, the 1982 UNCLOS regulating the question of
LLS' access to the sea may also be considered unequal treaties. These inequalities raise fundamental questions regarding the nature and functioning
of international law. This article aims to identify and interpret international
law through a postulated analogy between the R2P doctrine and LLS' access to the sea. Both concepts struggle to integrate themselves into international law. They stretch the frontiers of international law and run into
comparable obstructive "technicalities," which result from the way in which
scholars theorize and conceptualize international law.
This article argues that state sovereignty is still a robust and unavoidable principle of international law. The first section conceptualizes international law with regard to the R2P and LLS, while the second section
explores the possibilities of establishing customary rules on both issues.
The third section discusses the subordinate position of opposition groups
and LLS. The article then offers conclusions regarding the present state of
international law in light of the R2P and LLS's access to the sea.
I.

INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

(R2P)

AND LAND-LOCKED STATES (LLS)

International law is a construct of shared abstractions. In other words,
international law is a compilation of perceptions held by a multitude of
actors in the international system: states, international organizations, nonstate actors, non-governmental organizations, multinational companies, and
individuals. These actors all perceive international law to exist to a certain
degree. They share a regularity and a philosophy of international law. A
shared abstraction of international law is necessary for the clear formulation
of rights and obligations. In other words, "[a] law, to be legitimate, requires
a serious effort at formulating clear definitions of what is allowed and what
is prohibited, and at constituting a credible process for determining, in specific contested instances, which is which."l 3
Comparisons between newly developing concepts of international law
can be used as empirical tools to perceive and conceptualize international
law. Ideally, these comparisons will take the shape of analogies that can
identify common patterns in international law. "Analogy is high-level per-

1884. See Treaty of Peace and Friendship Between Chile and Bolivia, and Convention
for the Construction and Operation of a Railroad from Arica to La Paz, Chile-Bolivia,
art. 2, Mar. 28, 1905, State Dep't No. 427.
13. Thomas M. Franck, HumanitarianIntervention, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 531, 541 (Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 2010).
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ception,"' 4 that can help expose the dominant thread of international law.
Analogy can give international law a structural and semantic consistency, as
well as a defined purpose and may help to solve problems at hand. That is,
analogy can be used to solve problems where no previous authority in positive international law exists.
Analogy between concepts at the margins of international law is necessary to handle the straitjacket of positive international law. Opposition
groups and LLS dwell on the margins and peripheries of international law,
the stringencies of which they aim to mitigate: "Lawyers know that a legal
strategy encompassing mitigation, far from undermining the law, saves
normativity from being pushed over the cliff into reductio ad absurdum by
those who insist on its uniform application without due regard to the circumstances in which the rule is operating." 5 Thus, mitigation is not outside
positive law, but an integral part of it.
This is all the more true as there is no centralized world legislature or
other mechanism producing and enforcing international law. Thus, new
concepts that attempt to intrude into international law under the banner of
mitigation are, by definition, a challenge to the status quo. This challenge
produces baroque knowledge and baroque law: "The relative lack of central
power endows the baroque with an open-ended and unfinished character
that allows for the autonomy and the creativity of margins and peripheries."l 6 This framework is compatible with the view that there are multiple
globalizations instead of a single, homogeneous and wholly centralized one.
Indeed, "what we term globalization is in fact a set of different
processes of globalization and, in the last instance, of different and sometimes contradictory globalizations." 7 "There is no originally global condition; what we call globalization is always the successful globalization of a
particular localism."' Different claims clash and assert themselves as the
dominant global norm. Various demands and globalization challenge the
frontiers of international law, with each new claim of globalization tending
to object to existing inequalities in international law. The doctrines of the
R2P and LLS' access to the sea are global challenges to globalized inequalities. Supporters and opponents of both concepts invoke their own versions
of globalization using the language of international law.

&

14. See David J. Chalmers ET AL., High-level Perception, Representation, and
Analogy: A Critique of Artificial Intelligence Methodology, 4 J. of EXPERIMENTAL
THEORETICAL ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 185, 193-94 (1992).
15. Franck, supra note 13, at 546.

16. de Sousa Santos, supra note 1, at 576.
ETY

17. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Globalizations, 23
292, 295 (2006).

18. Id. at 396.

THEORY, CULTURE,

& SocI-
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Every version of globalization is a unique version of jurisdiction. The
way jurisdiction is allocated among states, and between states and international organizations, is a reflection of the dominant version of globalization.
This is a process in which jurisdiction is prone to change. Thus, battles over
jurisdiction are constant. "Jurisdictional battles between states are, from the
point of view of international law, not unsettling per se."l 9 That is, they are
not considered inherently damaging to the international order because jurisdictional battles are a way of dealing with competing jurisdictional claims. 20
"Hence, the precise reach of a state's jurisdiction is often only determined
in the-conflictual-interplay of claim and counter-claim . . . . "21 Thus,
under- and over-allocation of jurisdiction is a perpetual challenge of international law. Both the R2P and LLS' access to the sea challenge the status
quo vis-A-vis the allocation of jurisdiction-both question state jurisdiction
and argue for constraints upon state sovereignty.
Indeed, the baroque is about "being"; it is a continuum of unremitting
dissonances. A number of complex laws are thought to be excessively indirect or obscure so as to conceal or obscure their meaning. This confusion
creates a constant tension between the center and the periphery. Indeed,
opposition groups and LLS are actors on the periphery of international law
who can only assert their rights through confusing and opaque language.
This confusion is most evident in two instruments: the 2005 World Summit
Outcome document stating the claims and aims of the R2P, and the 1982
UNCLOS regulating LLS' access to the sea. Consistent with baroque reasoning, 22 both instruments are used deliberately for specified effects, and in
question is the demonstration of power rather than the establishment of substance. Both instruments aim to demonstrate the grandeur of international
law, not definitive regulation and dispute settlement. Both instruments are
politically focused and reflect the international system's inherent concern
that its hold over its adherents may be lost.
The baroque includes excessive and often incoherent details in order to
generate effect and grandeur. Baroque style reflects concerns that elites in a
political and normative system may lose power to their adherents. Indeed,
the term baroque is best used as a description of the art produced under the
influence of the Counter-Reformation and the seventeenth and eighteenth
19. Bruno Simma & Andreas Th. Miller, Exercise and Limits of Jurisdiction,in
&

134, 153 (James Crawford
Martti Koskenniemi eds., 2012).
20. Id. at 152.
21. Id. at 153.
22. See James Mark, The Uses of the Term Baroque, 33 MODERN LANGUAGE REV.
547, 553 (1938).
THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO INTENATIONAL LAW
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century despotisms. 23 The objective was to give the central powers formal,
imposing modes of expression that would restore or maintain their prestige.
Although the baroque may be considered a relic of a long-since vanished epoch, what it signified is still relevant today. The recovery of the
baroque was linked to the crisis of the Enlightenment and instrumental reason: 2 4 "In the first decades of the twentieth century, both European and
American theorists and writers rediscovered the modernity of the baroque,
that is, its [contemporaneous] response to the epistemological and religious
crises of the Scientific Revolution and the Reformation." 25 These crises parallel contemporary disappointment with international law. In light of its history, the notion of the neo-baroque is applicable to international law.
International law may thus be likened to a map, and "[t]he main structural feature of maps is that in order to fulfill their function, they inevitably
distort reality." 2 6 As such, omission and "forgetting" is an inherent quality
of maps. Every map is a reflection of the dichotomy between representation
and distortion. Similarly, international law is the stage of constant struggle
between representation and distortion. A map of unequal international treaties-such as the United Nations Charter and the 1982 UNCLOS-entails
omissions and distortions. Unequal international treaties can therefore be
conceptualized in the larger framework of "baroqueness."
The baroqueness of international law obliges us to assess the political
context and implicit understandings which are, in fact, more equitable than
the treaty texts. That is, unequal treaty regimes are most of the time "situated within broader political compacts," 27 and these unequal treaties are the
baroque instruments of international law. Indeed, quid pro quo reciprocity
may be built into international treaties, such as the UN Charter and the 1982
UNCLOS. Implicit reciprocities inherent in the broad and long-term political context may alleviate the explicit inequality in baroque international instruments, which are constructed for demonstration and effect.
In other words, there is an implicit belief that the larger political context would create conditions for progressive change to unequal treaty regimes. However, problems emerge when the political background to
23. See id. at 551.
24. Monika Kaup, Becoming-Baroque: Folding European Forms into the New
World Baroque with Alejo Carpentier,5 THE NEW CENTENNIAL REV. 107, 108 (2005).
25. Id. at 108.
26. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Law: A Map of Misreading. Toward a
Postmodern Conception of Law, 14 J.L. Soc'y 279, 282 (1987).
27. Shirley V. Scott, The Problem of Unequal Treaties in ContemporaryInternational Law: How the Powerful have Reneged on the PoliticalCompacts Within which
Five CornerstoneTreaties of Global Governance are Situated, 4 J. INT'L LAW & INT'L
REL. 101, 112 (2008).
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unequal treaties does not provide any grounds for hope for further change to
treaties. Because inequality is not a basis for treaty termination in and of
itself, solutions outside international law may be sought. Thus, the lack of
progress at a multilateral level may lead to bilateral or regional agreements-or worse, problems can be addressed via non-treaty arrangements
or informal mechanisms.
An unequal treaty is not reciprocal in its terms. 2 8 Nonetheless, the conclusion of a treaty must be voluntary. Traditional international law seems to
fail to recognize this imbalance, especially with regard to peace treaties. 2 9
While opposition groups are constrained by the unequal United Nations
treaty (a peace treaty following World War II), the unequal 1982 UNCLOS
(not a peace treaty) constrains LLS in their efforts to access the sea. Particularly relevant here is the 1904 Treaty between Bolivia and Chile (a peace
treaty), which endorsed the LLS status of Bolivia without providing a clear
legal basis to challenge Chilean sovereignty for maritime access. The unequal terms of these treaties cannot be readily remedied by general international law. There is no other treaty, custom, consistent state practice,
principle of law, arbitral award, or international court judgment that definitely endorses the R2P and LLS' access to the sea. Therefore, for the moment, academic discourse seems to be the only way for both doctrines to
slowly establish themselves as norms of international law.
The inequality disfavoring opposition groups and LLS, is based on the
asymmetric and unequal nature of international law. In contrast to private
law, where contractual freedom theoretically gives both parties equal bargaining power when establishing rights and obligations, international law
concerns general principles and working mechanisms set by the pre-eminent powers on the world stage. As a result, international law does not aim
to establish a democratic international system whereby every nation or entity may lay claim to equal terms with one other. The aim of international
law is to create an environment for international peace and security, not
equal participation rights for every aspirant. The "publicness" of international law is not concerned with equal access; rather, it engenders a system
in which every one of these dues is covered. For example, the United Nations Charter gives primary weight to peace and security, not to democratic
and just participation in international affairs and resources. 30 The UN Char28. See Katherine A. Greenberg, Hong Kong's Future:Can the People'sRepublic
of China Invalidate the Treaty of Nanking as an Unequal Treaty?, 7 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 534, 535 (1983).
29. Id. at 538.

30. United Nations Charter Article 2 does not count democracy as a principle to
be pursued by the United Nations, but gives primary weight to peace and security. See
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ter dilutes the complexity of international politics to international peace and
security. It is the filter-the map-of international law.
Communication within the system of international law operates by selecting a limited amount of available outside information. International law
communicates internally through attributing meaning to certain concepts.
The inclusion of certain concepts, to a degree, a priori implies the exclusion
of others. In other words, international law does not define or indeed recognize some concepts. In this respect, international law does not understand or
give meaning to the concept of "civil war" or "peoples." "International law
lacks a clear definition of both "self-determination" and "people" . . . . "31
Although the "environment" outside international law is replete with the
phenomena of civil wars and claims by peoples, neither the concept nor the
reality can claim any denoted meaning within the realm of international
law. The sovereign state, within the borders of which peoples' struggle, and
civil wars take place, cannot be compromised in terms of international law.
Common Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights ("ICCPR") and the International Covenant on Economic, Cultural
and Social Rights ("ICESCR") provide for the right to self-determination of
all peoples, but do not define the term. 32 Peoples constituting ethnic or religious groups or minorities have generally been denied legal standing in
international institutions (e.g., the United Nations), and before international
courts (e.g., the International Court of Justice). Meaning, they are not sufficiently visible in in the international system. 33 "The international community has consistently refused to define the word "people"; this meant that it
could decide each case involving 'people' on its own merits." 34 There is a
deliberate ambiguity regarding notions of self-determination and people.
Stated differently, it is not customary in international law to refer to "people" and "self-determination" as if they represent clearly regulated concepts, as they cannot be placed in the category of "normal" concepts.
generally Susan Marks,

INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE LEFr: RE-EXAMINING

MARXIST

26, 223, 240-5, 265 (2008).
31. Karen Knop, Statehood: territory,people and government, in THE CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 95, 101 (James Crawford & Martti Korkenniemi
eds. 2012).
32. G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200A (Dec. 16, 1966) ("All peoples
have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.").
33. Antonio Cassese, States: Rise and Decline of the PrimarySubects of the InterLEGACIES

national Community, in

THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL

67 (Bardo Fassbender et al. eds. 2012).
34. Jorg Fisch, Peoples and Nations, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 46 (Bardo Fassbender et al. eds., 2012).

LAW
OF

OF THE HISTORY
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Thus, the right to self-determination of peoples can be supported only
in "abnormal" or extra-ordinary situations-a view invoked by an international commission of jurists that pronounced on the 1920 Aaland Islands
dispute. 35 The question of whether Swedish-speaking Aalenders in Finland
had the right to self-determination was formulated in terms of abnormality.36 The commission envisaged self-determination not as a right in international law, but as a fundamental principle to be invoked in the case of a
serious sovereignty crisis. Indeed, the doctrine of the R2P endorsed this
abnormality in the 21st century. The abstraction of international law via the
R2P is based on the acknowledgement of the abnormality and ambiguity of
the realization of the notions of "people" and "self-determination."
Similarly, access to the sea for LLS has yet to be normalized. International law does not provide an independent right to access to the sea for
LLS. Again, the rights of the sovereign transit state cannot be circumvented. The UNCLOS is an "unequal treaty" for LLS, representing the reduced complexity of international politics. The UNCLOS does not prevent
future unequal bilateral treaties between transit states and LLS, nor did it
eliminate those that already exist. It does not provide for "equal access of
all peoples to the sea." By not recognizing unqualified access for access to
the sea for LLS, the UNCLOS has, in a way, reduced the complexity of
international law by making access to the sea for LLS an abnormal
phenomenon.
While LLS' right to access to the sea was addressed in the 1982 UNCLOS, the convention did not explicitly define a right of the LLS to have
access to the sea. Access to the sea for LLS is severely restricted and ultimately depends on the discretion of transit states. It could be argued that
this access was seen as a form of privilege rather than a right. The Convention "merely seems" to give a right to transit to LLS, but that is not a real
(and therefore enforceable) right. There are thirty-eight LLS in the world, 37
several of which have formed a distinct block of nations within the interna-

35. See Report by the Commission of Rapporteurs, League of Nations Council on
The Aaland Islands Question (On the Merits), League of Nations Doc. B7 21/68/106
(1921).
36. Finland made a similar statement before the ICJ as regards the Kosovar independence on 17 April 2009. Written Statement of Finland to the International Court of
Justice. See Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403, ¶¶ 7-9 (July 22),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15987.pdf.

37. Kishor Uprety,

THE TRANSIT REGIME FOR LANDLOCKED STATES: INTERNA-

TIONAL LAW AND DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES

3 (2005).
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tional system. 38 The most important question for the LLS is access to the
sea, and the block has demanded recognition from the international community for this fundamental 'right' of access. 39 During the negotiating process
of the 1982 Convention, their demands were voiced and some advantages
through the Convention seemed to have been gained.
For example, Article 125(1) of the UNCLOS states: "LLS shall have
the right of access to and from the sea for the purpose of exercising the
rights provided in this Convention, including those relating to the freedom
of the high seas and the common heritage of mankind." 40 To that end, LLS
enjoy freedom of transit through the territory of transit states by all means
of transport. However, Article 125(3) states that transit states, "in the exercise of their full sovereignty over their territory, shall have the right to take
all measures necessary to ensure that the relevant rights and facilities provided for the LLS shall in no way infringe upon legitimate interests of the
transit countries." 4 1 Transit states are therefore not obligated to grant transit
to the LLS, and transit states may exercise a certain amount of creativity in
discovering infringements upon their legitimate interests.
Articles 62, 69 and 70 of the UNCLOS appear to state that LLS have a
right of access to neighboring Exclusive Economic Zones-but only to any
surplus, and only under equitable bilateral, sub-regional or regional agreements with coastal states. 42 These provisions address living resources,
which are negligible when compared to mineral resources. 43 In practice, the
chances of a surplus are slim. 4 At best, then, this right seems imperfect.
Article 127 of the UNCLOS allows dues to be levied on traffic in
transit with the sole objective of defraying expenses that result from the
supervision and administration necessary to facilitate transit. Despite this
limited purpose, this provision is open to abuse by the transit countries who
can charge tariffs in excess of actual cost. There is no mechanism to limit
this type of abuse by transit states.
In sum, the status of the LLS is still not firmly established in international law. The UNCLOS brought nothing new to the ambiguous position
of the LLS as regards its access to the sea. The sovereignty of transit neigh38. See Kishor Uprety, From Barcelonato Montego Bay and Thereafter:A Search
for Landlocked States' Rights to Trade through Access to the Sea - A Retrospective
Review, 7 SING. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 201, 202 (2003).
39. See id. at 203.
40. UNCLOS, supra note 7, at art. 125(1).
41. Id. at art. 125(3).
42. Id. at art. 125(2).

43. Uprety, supra note 37, at 208.
44. Boleslaw Adam Boczek, Ideology and the Law of the Sea: The Challenge of
the New InternationalEconomic Order, 7 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 15 (1984).
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bors is pivotal to the functioning of this regime. LLS are dependent upon
the unilateral decisions made by transit states in addition to definitional and
operational ambiguities within the present LLS regime.
Similarly, the 2005 World Summit Outcome, the United Nations (UN)
General Assembly and the Security Council (SC) resolutions vis-A-vis the
R2P do little to dispel the ambiguities of the R2P, nor do they bring anything new to international law pertaining to the use of force. There are still
only two exceptions to the prohibition of the use of force as indicated in the
UN Charter: UN Security Council Resolution under Chapter VII and selfdefense under Article 51. State sovereignty remains paramount. Opposition
groups protected under the R2P depend on unilateral decisions made by
sovereign governments, and in the last instance, that is in the event of negligence or failure on the part of sovereign states within the borders of which
atrocities take place to stem the violence, the Security Council is the ultimate arbiter. 4 5 This is classic international law whereby the question of the
use of force is dictated by concerns of sovereignty and international peace
and security, not by concerns with domestic affairs and civil conflicts as
such.
Thus, treaty law with regard to the R2P and LLS' access to the sea
does not give much hope. It is inconceivable that a novel treaty will address
these issues in the near future. A plausible way for both the R2P and for the
principle of LLS' access to the sea to be transformed into rules of international law would seem to be the creation of norms of customary international law or through general principles of law in the field.
General principles of law as sources are not as self-sustaining as customary international law-they help interpret treaties and customs. A robust
R2P and LLS' access to the sea may not be established by an ambiguous
general principle in the absence of treaties and customs in the area. There
are advantages inherent in custom in contradistinction to treaties and general principles, as will be discussed below. A case for the customary quality
of the international rule of the R2P and the LLS' access to the sea seems the
most plausible way out for both issues in the framework of international
law. Customary rules on both issues could be established through either a
slow process or a Grotian moment-that is, a radical break with the current
status quo.

45. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept.
16, 2005).
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THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND THE LAND-LOCKED
STATES' ACCESS TO THE SEA: CUSTOMARY RULES?

Custom has certain advantages over other sources of international law.
Customary international law does not recognize a unilateral right to with-

draw from the custom. A customary rule need not be explicitly consented to
by every state. Even active and effective states constituting a minority of
the international community can establish a customary rule valid for the
entire international community. 46 Indeed, the International Law Association
has stated that it is not normally necessary for even a majority of states to
have engaged in a practice, provided that participation is sufficiently representative and there is no significant dissent. 47 The scope of the custom can
be larger than the parties to a treaty on the same issue. Custom can be
widely propagated. This is good news for the R2P and the issue of LLS's
access to the sea. R2P discourse and LLS discourse may crystallize into
customary rules without the participation of many states. This crystallization need not be based on consensus. The customary rule of the R2P and
LLS' access to the sea would not only bind persistent objectors, but a larger
and more flexible customary law may form in tandem with treaty law. In
this vein, the purported customary rule regarding LLS' access to the sea
cannot be constrained by the UNCLOS. Notwithstanding the constraints of
the Convention, LLS could pioneer an emerging customary rule through
intensive diplomacy and state conduct. Similarly, supporters of the R2P
doctrine could create a customary rule of the R2P even in the absence of
consensus.
Even "practice in action" 48 may not be needed for the customary rules
of the R2P and for LLS' access to the sea. That is, mere verbal acts may be
treated as evidence of a practice component of a customary norm of the
R2P. 49 Indeed, a custom may be formed through either the inductive claim
and response process or through a deductive process that begins with a gen46. Vaughan Lowe, InternationalLaw, Oxford University Press, 39-40 (2007).
47. Final Report of Committee on Formation of Customary International Law,
International Law Association, Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of
General Customary International Law (2000).
48. Michael P. Scharf, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TIMES OF FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE: RECOGNIZING GROTIAN MOMENTS 34-35 (2013).
49. See, e.g., Nottebohm (Liech. V. Guat.), 2nd Phase Judgment, 1955 I.C.J. 4, ¶¶
21-23 (Apr. 6); Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), Merits, 1974 I.C.J. 175, ¶ 55-58
(July 25); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. US.),
Merits, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 183-207 (June 27); Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶¶ 86-88 (July 8); Gabbikovo-Nagymaros
Project (Hung./Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 3, I 29-54, 83, 85 (Feb. 5).
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eral statement of rules, such as the United Nations General Assembly.50
Thus, the 2005 World Summit Outcome could constitute both the objective
condition (practice) and the subjective condition (belief, or opinio juris) of
the customary rule of the R2P. The "R2P discourse" as exemplified by the
2001 ICISS report, the 2005 World Summit Outcome, the United Nations
General Assembly and the Security Council resolutions endorsing the R2P
could, in their entirety, form a "verbal practice." One can make a similar
argument with regard to LLS' access to the sea. Indeed, the United Nations
General Assembly adopted resolutions regarding LLS' access to the sea,5
giving impetus and hope for the development of a customary norm on the
issue. A reference to the right of LLS' access to the sea was made in the
1982 Convention, even though it entails a number of exceptions and loopholes in terms of theory and implementation. Significantly, the Convention
was ratified by a large number of countries.5 2 A customary rule regarding
LLS' access to the sea would enlarge and consolidate in parallel to the same
LLS' access mentioned in more restrictive terms in the Convention.
Nevertheless, the influence of the General Assembly resolutions on the
R2P and LLS' access to the sea cannot be exaggerated. In his dissenting
opinion in the Expenses case, Judge Quintana stated:
Although Article 18 of the (United Nations) Charter lists the
"important questions" which are the subject of decisions of the General Assembly, such decisions, when concerned with the question of
the maintenance of international peace and security, merely assume
the form of recommendations; nor is there any international organ
which, by its decisions approving recommendations, can alter their
intrinsic character, which is non-obligatory. 5 3
Yet, the number of affirmative votes in a General Assembly resolution may
be an important factor in the formation of customary rule. Even if an area is
new to international law, a consensus resolution-such as the 2005 World
Summit Outcome-has considerable weight in creating a new customary
rule. Thus, the weak practice of the R2P-the only robust example being
the 2011 Libya intervention based on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973-would not obstruct the emergence of an eventual customary
rule of the R2P. The international community has solemnly declared that it
50. Scharf, supra note 48, at 37.
51. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 55/181, U.N. Doc. AIRES/55/181 (Jan 18, 2001); G.A. 58/
201, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/201 (Feb. 4, 2004).
52. 166 countries and the European Union are parties to the Convention. See UNCLOS, supra note 7, at art. 308(1).
53. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 IC. 29, at
250-51 (July 20) (dissenting opinion of Judge Quintana).
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is interested in resorting to the use of force for the sake of humanitarian
objectives.
The counterargument is that the real difficulty of the R2P establishing
itself as a customary rule of international law does not have anything to do
with the number of countries adhering to it in trendy summit declarations; it
has more to do with the assent of those where the R2P would be implemented. States that have the greatest concern over their territorial integrity
seem resistant to establish a rule of the R2P, particularly states that face
pressing problems with internal opposition groups. This is a considerable
obstacle because the voice of especially affected states is crucial to the establishment of R2P as a customary norm of international law.
With this in mind, the voice of the LLS states-which, through intensive lobbying, diplomacy, declarations, conferences, and General Assembly
resolutions-has been more vocal over the last decade, which may form a
verbal practice sufficient for the creation of an emerging customary norm
regarding access to the sea. 5 4 In this regard, discerning the existence of a
customary rule is not merely a numbers game; there is an important qualitative aspect to the inquiry,55 which is determined by the support and the
contribution of most affected. The voice and the practice of the specially
affected states-LLS-could be a determining factor in the formation of a
customary rule of LLS' access to the sea.5 6 However, transit states may
obstruct the formation of such a customary rule.
In this respect, the problem is that it is sometimes difficult to determine whether General Assembly resolutions reflect lexferenda (ideal law)
or lex lata (positive law). It could be argued that General Assembly resolutions often reflect a deliberate ambiguity between actual and desired practice, designed to develop the law and stretch the consensus on the text as far
as possible.57 The R2P could be said to incur such a fate. Yet, it could be
countered that the 2005 World Summit Outcome, which endorsed the R2P,
is a specific General Assembly resolution as proclaimed by heads of state
and government. This Summit was more than an ordinary General Assembly meeting.

54. See, e.g., "Improving Trade and Transport for Landlocked Developing Countries," (Washington, D.C., World Bank, 2008), availableat http://siteresources.world
bank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources.
55. Scharf, supra note 48, at 38.
56. North Sea Continental Shelf, (Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.), Merits, 1969 I.C.J. 4, ¶
74 (Feb. 20).
57. See Anthea E. Roberts, Traditional and Modem Approaches to Customary
InternationalLaw: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 757, 763 (2001); Scharf, supra
note 48, at 51.
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Nevertheless, it could be argued that the Summit Outcome merely entails an ambiguity in seeming to promulgate a new dimension to the use of
force in international law. In effect, it does not create any novelty at all. The
Summit Outcome endorses the status quo as regards the use of force by
underlining the predominant role of the SC in deciding military intervention
and thus merely integrates intervention for humanitarian ends into the
United Nations system.
Another problem related to this ambiguity is that states may vote for
resolutions in the General Assembly merely for the sake of image. Voting
for "trendy" and "popular" issues embellishes the standing of states. In such
resolutions, there is no intention of establishing a new rule of international
law. As a result, members of the General Assembly may vote casually and
58
"do not conceive of themselves as creating or changing international law."
Indeed, the contours of the R2P, as indicated in the General Assembly
resolutions, are not definitely known. The R2P is open to abuse and manipulation. In a similar vein, LLS' access to the sea, as solemnly regulated by
the UNCLOS in the language of rights, contains a number of exceptions,
which in turn degrade its "rights" status. These easily manipulable exceptions create ambiguities concerning the right to access to the sea.
Still, it can be countered that for the establishment of customary rules,
its scope and practicalities need not necessarily be precisely pre-defined.
Ambiguity and exceptions do not pose obstacles to the formation of customary international law. Piracy is a case in point. Until quite recently, no
precise definition of piracy existed: "it was not known whether acts by state
vessels and recognized belligerents were exempt or whether the act is to be
by one ship against another or may take place on the same ship." 9 While a
debate over the parameters of the crime of piracy has always existed, the
offense was not deprived of a universal legal character. 60 The international
crime of piracy has been recognized and prosecuted throughout history.
Similar definitional and operational ambiguities inherent in the rapidly
formed customary international law of the R2P and of LLS' access to the
sea can be worked out in the future. In the meantime, however, they could
be deemed customary norms of international law.
A Grotian moment denotes a transformative development in which
new rules and doctrines of customary international law emerge with unu-

58. Stephen M. Schwebel, The Effect of Resolutionsof the U.N. GeneralAssembly
on Customary InternationalLaw, 73 AM. Soc'v INT'L L. 301, 302 (Apr. 26-28, 1979).
59. Malvina Halberstam, Terrorism on the High Seas: the Achille Lauro, Piracy
and the IMO Convention on Maritime Safety, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 269, 272 (1988).
60. Scharf, supra note 48, at 99.
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sual rapidity and acceptance. 6 1 In the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf
case, the International Court of Justice stated that customary norms could
sometimes form rapidly-that is, a short period does not prevent the existence and the emergence of a new rule of customary international law. 62
This is understandable, as it is necessary to stay abreast with the pace of
international developments. Yet, whereas nowadays the popular concept of
"instant custom" only requires the existence of endorsing General Assembly resolutions, the concept of a Grotian moment demands a foundation of
state practice. 63
Indeed, the content and the status of specific terms may change rapidly. A fundamental change of circumstances as perceived by the actors in
international law may pave the way for the strengthening and legalization of
concepts and doctrines. Hence, Grotian moments are critical turning points
in international law. They influence and impinge upon the semiotics of international law.
Although the R2P and the issue of LLS' access to the sea are new
concepts, a Grotian moment can transform both into rules of international
law. The "problematization" of both concepts in international law has
gained prominence. Indeed, the R2P emerged in 2001 and was endorsed
universally by the 2005 United Nations World Summit Outcome, while the
ultimate effort for framing LLS' right to access to the sea-the UNCLOSentered into force in 1994. The question thus becomes whether LLS' access
to the sea and the R2P have become or may become customary rules
through Grotian moments. As there is a lack of regular practice as regards
both concepts, a Groatian moment of customary international law may be
invoked to argue for the integration of both-the R2P and LLS' access to
the sea-into international law.
The difficulty of establishing norms of the R2P and LLS' access to the
sea is also tied to the effort to replace already firmly established customary
and treaty rules. The R2P does not create a new rule in a hitherto unregulated realm of international law. There should be a higher threshold of uniformity and consistency in state practice to eliminate an already well-settled
treaty (UN Charter) and customary law on the use of force. The R2P does
not aim to regulate a new territory, but an already established field-the use
of force defined in the UN charter. The same is true of the LLS and access
to the sea. There is no established norm of free LLS' access to the sea
because the issue has been absolutely resolved in favor of the sovereign
rights of transit states. All in all, classical international law is predicated on
61. Id. at 5.
62. North Sea Continetal Shelf, Merits, 1969 I.C.J. 4, ¶¶ 71, 73, 74 (Feb. 20).
63. Scharf, supra note 48, at 9.
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the understanding that opposition groups and LLS do not have perfect
rights. They are not full-fledged participants in international law; rather,
they are subordinates of international law.

III.

SUBORDINATES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: OPPOSITION GROUPS
AND LAND-LOCKED STATES

Hierarchies are an inherent feature of the international legal order. In
these hierarchies some entities hold a subordinate position-for example,
LLS and opposition groups. Both LLS and opposition groups are economically and socially weak, and their military apparatus, if any, is modest.
They therefore need to rely on persuasion and on international law to inform and characterize their relations with other states." Nevertheless, their
legal position remains constrained.
On the one hand, the R2P is not based on any international treaty, and
whether it has become a customary norm or a general principle of law is
open to debate. The "R2P discourse" following the 2001 ICISS Report convened by Canada, the 2005 World Summit Outcome, the United Nations
General Assembly and the Security Council resolutions have not changed
the legal position of opposition groups fighting sovereign governments. On
the other hand, LLS rely on the purported right of servitude-restriction on
the sovereign rights of the transit state-to pass through the territory of the
transit state. However, there is no principle of servitude in international law.
LLS ultimately have to rely on bilateral agreements with transit states to
obtain access to the sea, which "is in marked contrast to the relatively free
right of innocent passage through territorial waters or through international
straits." 65 Hence, while opposition groups need to maintain good relations
with the sovereign state, LLS need to maintain good relations with the sovereign transit state.
The R2P aims to blur the line between civil and international wars.
Yet, the porosity between national and international affairs stemming from
an eventual "legal rule" of the R2P would destabilize the post-World War II
system, which is based on a purported distinction between the two. The
obstacle to the legalization of the R2P is the legal prohibition of intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states, 66 which would be risked by a
convergence between international and domestic affairs, an axiom also
valid for LLS' access to the sea. An eventual granting of a "right" to access
64. See generally Martin Ira Glassner, The Status of Developing Land-Locked
States Since 1965, 5 LAW. AM. 480 (Oct. 1973), availableat http://www.jstor.org/stable
/40175495
65. Id.
66. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2; art. 2, paras. 1, 4, 7.
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to the sea for LLS would blur the contours of the sovereignty of the transit
state and could very well legitimize intervention into the internal affairs of
sovereign transit states.
Is access to the sea therefore condemned to revolve around the issue of
the sovereignty of the transit state? In substance, the 1982 UNCLOS does
not give any hope with regard to the establishment in international law of a
robust LLS right of access. The transit state still retains full powers. But,
didn't the 1982 Convention also create legitimate expectations on the part
of the LLS? If the high seas cannot be subject to the sovereignty of any
country under the Convention, 67 is this an opening for LLS? The high seas
cannot be exclusively appropriated by states that enjoy a coastline. Furthermore, the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof are beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction under Article 136 of the UNCLOS. They are the
common heritage of mankind; 6 8 "mankind signifies a community that is
more inclusive than a society of individual, sovereign states."6 9
The concept of the common heritage of mankind embodied in the regulation of the high seas and the deep seabed aims to overcome an understanding of international law vigorously based on state sovereignty. The
concept of a common heritage of mankind forages for "special sovereignty
areas" that stand as exceptions to state sovereignty. 70
Similarly, the R2P aims to create a "special sovereignty area." It aims
to institute special cases of intervention by the international community into
these specified 'special sovereignty areas' and to institute a third exception
to the prohibition of use of force in international law. Thus, Article 2(7)71
67. See UNCLOS, supra note 7, at art. 89 (stating that, "No State may validly
purport to subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty.").
68. See Scott J. Schakelford, The Tragedy of the Common Heritage of Mankind,
28 STAN. ENvT'L L.J. 109, 141-42 (2009) (Five space law treaties signed between 1967
and 1981 mention "mankind" and "people" instead of "states" and "nations." Space law
considers the welfare of people as the beginning and end of all human activity and
recognizes all humans as the holders of fundamental, non-transferable rights.)
69. Wouter G. Werner, Mankind's Territory and the Limits of InternationalLawMaking, in INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING, ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JAN KLABBERS 103,
118 (Rain Livoja & Jarna Petman eds., 2014).

70. Under the Concert of Europe, Wilson's conception of self-determination, or
modern human rights law and the doctrine of "responsibility to protect," governments
have-for varying reasons-collectively decided to recognize private individuals, groups,
and political movements against ruling governments. See Andrew Moravcsik, Liberal
Theories of InternationalLaw, in INTERNATION LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:

1, 50 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2012).
71. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7 ("Nothing contained in the present Charter
shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matTHE STATE OF THE ART
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and Chapter VII of the UN Charter would suffice in integrating the R2P
into the UN law on the use of force. Article 2(7) of the UN Charter-which
prohibits intervention into domestic affairs of states-does not prevent intervention on the part of the UN through a Chapter VII resolution. Actually,
Article 2(7) contains the seeds of integrating domestic affairs-civil
wars-into the rubric of international peace and security as envisioned by
Chapter VII. Enforcement measures and actions under Chapter VII may
involve domestic matters, too.
Yet, one cannot argue that every civil war is also a matter of international peace and security. Civil wars generally cannot be designated as
"special sovereignty areas" in which "mankind" would have sovereignty.
Furthermore, forcing the boundaries of legal texts may not be a healthy
path. It could be maintained that both the R2P and the issue of LLS' access
to the sea are political questions that are not amenable to legal analysis.
Global political decision was made for the post-1945 period and accordingly opposition groups and LLS are subordinates of the international system. With this framework in mind, both issues should be developed and
debated in international politics. Only challenges to the post-war political
settlement that are serious and mature enough can ultimately be integrated
into international law.
The counter argument is that although political and legal questions can
and often are closely intertwined, this does not detract from the legal quality
of the dispute. Indeed, international law makes sense as long as it is transformed in parallel to global transformations on the political plane. The International Court of Justice, the judicial organ of the United Nations, for
instance, does not hesitate to qualify seemingly political issues as legal disputes. The Court has, on many occasions, indicated that the political aspect
of a legal dispute does not hinder its conceptualization in legal terms and
adjudication. 72 Moreover, both the R2P and the LLS issue are closely related to timeless questions of classical international law-prohibition of the
use of force and the delimitation of sea frontiers.
Still, one can counter that a premature pronouncement on the legal
merits of both issues would prejudice the political means of settlement. If
legal terminology intervenes into the political process at an inopportune
time, the latter could be obstructed. The political process consists of concrete cases in which practical consequences are sought after and analyzed.
ters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VI.")
72. See, e.g., Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 13 (July 8); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Adivsory
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 41 (Jan. 30).
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Only when the quantity and the quality of these accumulated concrete cases
and their practical repercussions reach a certain point of maturity, can an
effective relief in law be sought. Only then can status and remedies for both
the R2P and LLS' access to the sea be established in international law. That
is, application of the R2P and LLS' access to the sea to concrete controversies may inductively pave the way for legalization in the field. The challenge with this approach concerns the determination of the cut-off period
when political developments will be deemed mature enough to be transformed into international law.
Opponents of the legalization of both concepts could also argue that
more suitable fora may be available for the resolution of disputes within
either issue. Informal mechanisms and understandings among states, mutual
comprehension among concerned parties and diplomacy could create a
favorable atmosphere for the R2P and LLS' access to the sea without recourse to the "hard law" sources of international law-namely, treaty or custom. Yet this attitude would be an acknowledgement that international law
cannot cover every major issue facing the international community and
would deny the "publicness"-"completeness"-of international law. Second, this would satisfy neither the supporters nor the opponents of either
doctrine. Supporters would argue that their rights are invoked through speculative and informal means, while opponents would argue that issues which
have not been established by international law emerge on the world stage
via indirect and informal mechanisms, the long-term consequences of
which are difficult to predict. Both the R2P and LLS' access to the sea
would be caught in a limbo, setting the stage for perennial struggle that
would render both parties feeling insecure.
Still, approaching both concepts in formal and legalistic terms would
be too rigid and of little practical utility. More importantly, crucial facts and
interests would be disregarded in search for broad and overarching legal
principles. Both the R2P and the issue of LLS' access to the sea involve
vital interests for states-the very survival of nation-states. Traditional international law may thus be irrelevant to conflicts involving vital national
interests.
The state encountering the opposition group and the transit state facing
the challenge from the LLS may deem these issues as matters falling within
their utmost sovereignty. Yet, "somehow or other the legal system must
find means of satisfying the vital interests of states so far as they are reasonable." 74 In fact, most of these vital interests which the law finds so intracta73. Francis A. Boyle, The Irrelevance of InternationalLaw: the Schism Between
InternationalLaw and InternationalPolitics, 10 CAL. W. L. REV. 193, 198 (1980).
74. J.L. Brierly, Vital Interests and the Law, 21 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 51, 54 (1944).
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ble have their origins in the insecurity of the existing order." 7 5 The issues of
R2P and LLS' access to the sea expose the insecurity prevalent in the international system. The more insecure the international community feels, the
more both concepts appear political rather than legal.
Therefore, the legalization of the R2P and LLS' access to the sea could
be countered on the ground that they are only capable of political appreciation. This is closely related with the doctrine of non-justiciability. That is to
say, some relationships may remain non-justiciable simply because existing
substantive law categories are insufficient and cannot cope with said relationships. 76 "The absence of available criteria demonstrating a right and objective standard of measurement, underlying political tensions and the
potential incompleteness or inconclusiveness of an affirmative judgment all
77
strongly suggest that the dispute is essentially non-justicable."
The perception of justiciability is also influenced by the observer's
conception of the nature of international society.78 International society and
its law may not be deemed mature or complete enough to deal with important issues touching upon state sovereignty. That is, "disputes are political
(as distinguished from legal) and not suitable for arbitration (or judicial
settlement) if they touch upon important matters, i.e., matters included in
the very elastic conception of independence." 79 In this view, legal disputes
are disputes that do not involve the life and future fate of nations.8 0 Consequently, only questions of minor importance can be said to be justiciable.
Ultimately, justiciability is a matter of policy."1 Indeed, "the distinction
between legal and political disputes is highly relative, and the only decisive
test is the willingness of the disputants to submit the conflict to the arbitrament of law." 82 Whereas the legalization of the R2P still seems far off, the
UNCLOS and the recent application of Bolivia to the ICJ for access to the
sea are initiatives for the justiciability of LLS' access to the sea. In this
respect, the justiciability of the R2P and the LLS depend on whether or not
the international society feels mature enough to engage in a policy of legalization and adjudication.
75. Id. at 56.
76. Ian Brownlie, The Justiciabilityof Disputes and Issues in InternationalRelations, 42 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 123, 136 (1967).
77. Cornelius F. Murphy, Jr., The South-West Africa Judgment: A Study in Justiciability, 5 DuQ. L. REv. 477, 479 (1966-67).
78. Id.
79. H. Lauterpacht, The Doctrine of Non-Justiciable Disputes in International
Law, 24 ECONOMICA 277, 285 (1928).
80. Id. at 286.
81. Brownlie, supra note 76, at 142.

82. Lauterpacht, supra note 79, at 305.
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CONCLUSION

International law is public law. It aims at regulating "all" concerns of
the international community. International law is the abstraction and a conceptualization of the participants in the international system, yet, there is no
equality between the participants of international law. States are the primary
participants and reside at the apex of this construct. Indeed, state sovereignty is the cornerstone of international law. Although demands for equality and better treatment by weaker participants are frequent and widespread,
inequality and hierarchies are endemic in international law. The tension between strong and weak participants and the confusing language covering
these tensions reveal an intrinsic and implicit baroqueness to international
law.
Neither the R2P nor the matter of LLS' access to the high seas is an
easy issue to integrate into international law. For all its purported dynamism, openness and discourse of change, international law is arguably a
conservative field and conservative discipline. Anxieties and issues over
international peace, security and stability override all other considerations,
such as the R2P and LLS' access to the sea. The mainstay and cornerstone
of international law in providing stability in international relations is the
sovereign equality of states, and both the R2P and the LLS clash with this
bedrock of international law. The challenge put to international law by the
existence and persistence of these two concepts questions the fine line that
delineates international politics and international law. The result is the disclosure of the fragility that exists within the fabric of international law.

